Recently, in accordance with the relevant stability-work arrangements from the City Party Committee, the City Public Security Bureau has, in order to gain a better understanding of developments in the higher-education sector, further strengthened its stability-maintenance task force for higher-education institutions, building on the intelligence and information work mechanisms for higher-education institutions that were established during earlier periods, to simultaneously coordinate covert operative support, closely monitor developments in the higher-education sector, and promptly obtain in-depth inside intelligence and information. Overall, since June 28, all higher and secondary specialized educational institutions have gradually begun their summer breaks. Teaching activities currently remain orderly and the ideological state of faculty and students is relatively stable, but certain risks and potential hazards remain. The details are as follows:
I. Overview of the higher and secondary specialized educational institutions in Urumqi
First, the city currently has 52 higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, with 76 campuses. These include 8 regular undergraduate institutions, 15 higher vocational institutions (3 under the Bingtuan), 27 secondary vocational institutions (16 under the region, 10 under the city, and 1 under the Bingtuan), and 2 religious institutions.
Second, there are 4 private colleges and 328 private non-degree training institutions (37 under the autonomous region, 291 under the city, and 7 ethnic-language institutions).
Third, the city's higher and secondary specialized educational institutions currently have a total of 211688 enrolled students and 21474 teaching and administrative staff.
Fourth, according to currently available information, across the city's higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, 488 enrolled students have been taken into custody (taken for education), 5573 students have relatives who have been taken into custody (taken for education), and 7044 students have a "tag".
II. All higher and secondary specialized educational institutions are able to focus on the overall goal and conscientiously implement the stability-maintenance measures of the Autonomous Region Party Committee
(i) On-campus security measures are fairly well implemented across the board
All educational institutions are able to strictly implement the system of leaders overseeing duty shifts, with reinforced shifts personally overseen by their principal leaders during critical and sensitive periods. They also actively strengthen coordination with the police stations at the higher-education institutions, the jurisdiction police stations, the nearby police service stations, and the specialized task forces stationed at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, establishing a coordinated stability-maintenance mechanism. They rigorously inspect vehicles and individuals entering campuses, conduct routine campus security patrols, increase visible police presence, and regularly conduct joint mobilization drills with police stations and police service stations to enhance their capacity to respond to emergencies and handle unexpected incidents.
(ii) Day-to-day student management is orderly, and control and supervision of focus students is well implemented
All educational institutions have widely implemented closed management, have strictly enforced the system for requesting and terminating leave, and have strictly prohibited enrolled students from renting housing or staying overnight off campus. At the same time, for students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education), they have established a system of "three-tier care and management" involving institution and department leaders, class heads, and student counselors, have created an individual file for each student, have designated personnel and responsibilities, have implemented "one-on-one" and "many-on-one" education-assistance measures, and have strictly carried out "daily meetings, weekly summaries, and monthly assessments", keeping a firm grasp on the actual activities and mental state of the focus students. In response to the lack of income and financial hardship faced by students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education), some educational institutions have provided a certain degree of financial assistance by disbursing student grants and establishing work-study positions.
(iii) Routine on-campus inspections are conducted, strictly preventing the proliferation of illegal religious activities
Higher and secondary specialized educational institutions throughout the city actively strengthen ties with public security organs and independently purchase the "Counter-Terrorist Sword" to regularly inspect the teaching and administrative staff's mobile phones, computers, and portable storage media. In conjunction with dormitory management, students’ electronic devices, personal belongings, and items stored in dormitories are inspected to promptly detect any instances of storing or viewing illegal religious and violent terrorist multimedia files, as well as any illegal religious activities conducted in the dormitories.
III. Risks and potential hazards at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, as well as problems in the implementation of stability-maintenance work
(i) Students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) and students with "tags" face difficulties in daily life and employment, which can easily push them into opposition
As learned through visits, with the neighborhood administrations and other grassroots stability-maintenance forces continuing to strengthen daily management and control-supervision work, some internship units and departments have cited various reasons to turn away interns and graduates whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or who have "tags", in order to avoid being affected themselves. Some units and departments have even extended this exclusion to ethnic minority students in general, treating them differently from Chinese-speaking students. This has left ethnic minority students, and the focus students in particular, facing difficulties finding employment, substantial obstacles in daily life, and heavy psychological burdens. In addition, some focus students worry that they will be taken into custody or taken for education if they return to their place of origin. These multiple forms of pressure can easily push these students into opposition, or even into participating in endangering-security violent terrorist activities.
For example: Principal Liu of the Xinjiang Supply and Marketing School reported that when students from the school who have a "tag" undertake internships or find employment, the neighborhood administration requires the person in charge of the employing unit to take the students with "tags" to report to the neighborhood administration every day, causing considerable disruption to the businesses’ daily operations and leading some businesses to stop recruiting students with "tags".
(ii) Standards for control and supervision work involving focus students are inconsistent, the work is highly challenging, and some teaching and administrative staff have been implicated as a result of the control and supervision work
First, as grasped following visits, when schools carry out day-to-day control and supervision work for students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) and students with "tags", inconsistent standards across public security organs, neighborhood administrations, and higher-level supervisory teams, along with the complexity of form types and documentation categories, have resulted in more than 30 types of forms needing to be completed as part of the control and supervision work for just 1 student.
Second, to implement the "daily meetings" system, prepare all required control and supervision materials, and avoid problems during supervisory inspections, some schools have adopted practices disconnected from actual needs, frequently holding talks with students under control and supervision and requiring them to affix their fingerprints. This has caused strong resentment among students, while leaving teachers with heavy workloads and considerable stress.
Third, some teaching and administrative staff have repeatedly been flagged to go to the neighborhood administration for verification because of being in phone contact with students under control and supervision. They have been required to report to the neighborhood administration daily and provide updates on their mental state, leaving some teaching and administrative staff unwilling to participate in the student control and supervision work, or even prompting them to resign outright, so as to avoid being implicated.
For example: Seven student counselors (5 Han, 1 Hui, and 1 Uyghur) at Xinjiang Normal University (Wenguang Campus on East Kashgar Road) resigned and left the university one after another because of, among other reasons, heavy workloads, intense pressure, prolonged periods of being unable to return home, and repeated checks by the neighborhood administration, prompted by their phone contact with students under control and supervision.
(iii) The continued, in-depth implementation of the "Study, Purge, Counter" campaign has yielded fairly good results, but a small minority of teaching and administrative staff are under considerable psychological pressure
In accordance with arrangements made by the Autonomous Region Department of Education, colleges and universities across our city have continued to carry out the "Study, Purge, Counter" special campaign in depth, requiring all teaching and administrative staff to repeatedly review their conduct, engage in self-analysis, look back on their participation in religious activities since entering the workforce, and critically examine their motives and purposes for participating. The majority of teaching and administrative staff who have participated in "nezir" and "circumcision" activities are unsure of whether they have violated any regulations. In addition, schools are reexamining the papers and books published by each teacher. Some teachers worry that content they have written or quoted from others in their articles may be problematic. They also fear that any relatives suspected of participating in endangering-security activities could adversely affect them, resulting in steadily mounting psychological pressure.
For example: At the Xinjiang Vocational and Technical College of Communications, a student counselor concealed the fact that her husband had been taken into custody and was dismissed after this was discovered by the school, while an externally hired teacher was reassigned from a teaching position because of low proficiency in the national language;
Weli Tursun, director of the Xinjiang Light Industry Vocational and Technical College, repeatedly stated in public that he had failed to properly manage his family following his younger sister being taken into custody at her place of origin, which, combined with the heavy workload and intense pressure, caused his psychological burden to increase sharply, resulting in his death by suicide on June 13, jumping from Apartment 1503 at 16 No. 1 Jianquan Street in the Tianshan District.
(iv) Students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) are unwilling to return to their place of origin during school breaks, remaining in our city and making social management work more difficult
As learned through visits, students at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions must leave campus during winter (summer) vacations and are strictly prohibited from remaining on campus, in accordance with arrangements made by the Autonomous Region Department of Education. However, some students from northern and southern Xinjiang whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) worry that upon returning to their place of origin they will be implicated because their relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education). During winter (summer) vacations, most of these students are unwilling to return to their place of origin and instead rent accommodations or stay with relatives in Urumqi, making our day-to-day management work more difficult.
(v) Some secondary vocational schools are unwilling to admit students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or students with "tags"; these students enter society prematurely, which can easily give rise to potential risks
As has been learned, in the past when high school graduates were not admitted to universities or junior colleges and were unwilling to repeat their final year of high school, they could attend technical secondary schools at their own expense. Starting this year, however, some technical secondary schools have contacted neighborhood administrations and police service stations during admissions for help investigating the applicants’ backgrounds. Schools have used various pretexts to reject students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or who have "tags", in order to avoid bringing trouble upon themselves. As a result, these students are left to fend for themselves in society, eking out a living through sporadic casual work and becoming easy targets for recruitment by extremists.
(vi) Prefectural public security organs fail to provide notification or feedback when taking into custody (taking for education) students from our city's higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, resulting in delays in subsequent follow-up work
It has been learned during work that some prefectural public security organs in northern and southern Xinjiang have, to meet investigative needs, contacted enrolled students by telephone and called them back to their place of origin to investigate them, or have investigated students while they were home on vacation and then applied the measures of taking them into custody or taking them for education immediately after. When the local public security sub- or county bureaus, or the school authorities, contact the students’ places of origin about these matters, the public security organs at the place of origin do not provide timely feedback, or withhold information on the grounds of investigative confidentiality. As a result, we cannot accurately ascertain which students have been taken into custody (taken for education). Some students have returned to school and resumed classes after being released, but the follow-up control and supervision work has not been timely.
(vii) The handover of control and supervision responsibilities for graduates and preparatory students is not standardized
First are students studying at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions in our city who are about to graduate and whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or who have "tags". Second are students admitted to universities in inner China who are taking preparatory courses at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions in our city and whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or who have "tags". The handover of control and supervision work, for when these students graduate or complete their preparatory courses and leave to attend universities in inner China, lacks the necessary institutional and procedural safeguards, making lapses and omissions in control and supervision likely.
IV. Next steps and recommendations
First, rely on the specialized task forces and liaison personnel stationed at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions to maintain a close grasp of the developments in higher education. Deploy plainclothes squads and mobilize covert operatives, relying on the specialized task forces and liaison personnel stationed at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions to closely monitor developments among teaching and administrative staff and students, promptly identifying any unusual shifts in thinking, abnormal emotional reactions, observed suspicious activities, and the like.
Second, strengthen contact with the regional department and coordinate with the various prefectural public security organs to further standardize the work of taking into custody (taking for education) students who are enrolled. Further strengthen routine liaison with the regional department and standardize coordination and notification mechanisms for the various prefectural public security organs taking into custody (taking for education) students who are enrolled, ensuring real-time awareness of the situation and timely follow-up work.
Third, it is recommended that standards for student control and supervision work be unified to reduce unnecessary workloads. It is recommended that the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the City Party Committee coordinate with the supervision and guidance group, neighborhood administrations, and public security organs to unify the standards for student control and supervision work. In accordance with the spirit of the relevant directives from the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Autonomous Region Party Committee and in light of actual circumstances, concrete steps should then be taken to reduce the number of forms required for routine control and supervision work, easing the burden on teaching and administrative staff so they can better focus on teaching.
Fourth, it is recommended that the handover of students under control and supervision be standardized. It is recommended that the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the City Party Committee coordinate with higher authorities and relevant departments to standardize the handover of students under control and supervision after graduation or completion of preparatory programs, ensure a seamless transition, and strictly prevent any lapses in control and supervision that could pose risks to stability.
July 3, 2018
To: Bureau Director Tao Hongjun, Deputy Bureau Director
Qadir Memet, Deputy Bureau Director
Juret Ibrahim, Integrated Joint Operations Command Center.
Edited by: Hu Changxing Reviewed by: Ma Wenjun Issued by: Wang Dongsheng
permanent link近期,根据市委稳定工作相关部署,市公安局为进一步掌握高校领域动态情况,在前期高校情报信息工作机制的基础上,进一步强化高校维稳专班,同步调度秘密力量配合,密切关注高校领域动态情况,及时获取深层次、内幕性情报信息。总体来看,6月28日以来,各大中专院校已经开始陆续放暑假,目前教学活动井然有序,师生队伍思想相对稳定,但依然存在一定的风险隐患。具体情况如下:
一、乌鲁木齐大中专院校总体情况
一是全市现有大中专院校共52所76个校区。其中,普通本科院校8所,高等职业院校15所(兵团3所),中等职业院校27所(区属16所、市属10所、兵团1所),宗教类院校2所。
二是民办院校4所,民办非学历培训机构328所(自治区所属37所,市所属291所,民语系7所)。
三是全市大中专院校现有在校学生共211688人,教职员工21474人。
四是目前掌握,全市大中专院校中,被收押(收教)在校学生488人,亲属被收押(收教)学生5573人,有“标签”学生7044人。
二、各大中专院校能够聚焦总目标,认真贯彻落实自治区党委维稳措施
(一)校内安保措施普遍比较到位
各院校能够严格落实领导带班制,重点、敏感时段,实行校主要领导亲自带班的加强班。并且积极与高校派出所、辖区派出所、周边警务站以及驻大中专院校工作专班强化协作,形成维稳联动机制,严查入校车辆和人员,常态化开展校园安保巡逻工作,提升见警率,定期与派出所、警务站进行联合拉动演练,提升应急处突能力。
(二)学生日常管理有序,重点学生管控到位
各院校普遍实施了封闭式管理,严格落实请销假制度,严禁在校生在校外租房或留宿校外。同时,针对亲属被收押(收教)学生,建立院系领导、班主任、辅导员“三级关怀、管理”制度,建立一人一档,定人定责,实施“一对一、多对一”的帮教措施,严格落实“日见面,周总结,月研判”工作,密切掌握重点学生的现实活动和思想动态。部分院校针对亲属被收押(收教)学生没有经济来源,生活困难等现状,采取发生助学金,设立勤工俭学岗等方式,给予一定程度的经济帮助。
(三)常态化开展校内清查工作,严防滋生非法宗教活动
全市大中专院校积极与公安机关加强联系,并自主购买“反恐利剑”,定期对教职员工手机、电脑及移动存储介质进行检查,并结合宿管工作,对学生使用的电子产品,随身物品,宿舍存放物品进行检查,及时发现存储、观看非法宗教和暴恐音视频,在宿舍进行非法宗教活动的情况。
三、大中专院校风险隐患及维稳工作落实中存在的问题
(一)亲属被收押(收教)及“标签”学生的生活、就业存在困难,易将学生推向对立面
走访了解,由于社区等基层维稳力量不断加强日常管理、管控工作,一些实习单位和部门为避免自身受到影响,以各种理由推辞,不接收亲属被收押(收教)及有“标签”的实习生和毕业生,甚至个别单位和部门将范围扩大到少数民族学生群体,与汉语系学生区别对待,造成少数民族学生,特别是重点学生就业困难,生活阻力大,心理负担重。加之,部分重点学生担心返回原籍被收押、收教,多重压力下,易刺激这些学生走向对立面,甚至参与危安暴恐活动。
如:新疆供销学校刘校长反映,该校具有“标签”学生在实习、就业过程中,社区要求用人单位负责人每天带领“标签”学生到社区报到,给企业的日常工作带来很多困扰,导致一些企业不再招录“标签”学生。
(二)重点学生管控工作标准不一,难度较大,且部分教职员工因管控工作受到牵连
一是走访掌握,学校在落实亲属被收押(收教)及“标签”学生的日常管控工作中,由于公安机关、社区、上级督导组的标准不统一,表格种类、材料名目复杂,仅1名学生的管控工作,需填写的表格就多达30余种。
二是一些学校为落实“日见面”制度,备齐备全管控材料,避免督导检查出现问题,工作脱离实际,频繁与管控学生谈话,按捺手印,造成学生抵触情绪大,教师工作任务重、压力大的现状。
三是有部分教职员工因与管控学生电话联系,反复被推送到社区进行核查,要求每日到社区报到,汇报思想动态,导致一些教职员工不愿参与学生管控工作,甚至直接辞职,避免受到牵连。
如:新疆师范大学(喀什东路文光校区)有7名辅导员(汉族5名,回族1名,维吾尔族1名),因工作任务重、压力大,长期不能回家,加之因与管控学生电话联系,多次被社区核查等原因,陆续辞职离校。
(三)“学肃反”活动的持续深入开展,取得较好成效,少部分教职员工心理压力教大
按照自治区教育厅安排,我市各大院校持续、深入开展“学肃反”专项活动,要求每位教职员工反复对照检查,自我剖析,回顾参加工作以来,参与宗教活动的情况,自我检讨参与的动机、目的,大部分参与过“乃孜尔”、“割礼”活动的教职员工,不清楚是否已经违规。加之,学校对每位教师发表的论文、出版的书籍重新审读,部分教师担心文章中自己撰写或引用他人的内容存在问题,并且担忧因亲属涉嫌参与危安活动,对自身产生不好的影响,造成心理压力持续增加。
如:新疆交通职业技术学院,1名辅导员隐瞒丈夫被收押的情况,学校发现后将其开除,1名外聘教师因国语水平较低,被调离教学岗位;新疆轻工职业技术学院院长
瓦力·吐尔逊,因其妹妹被原籍收押,曾多次在公开场合表示,是自己没有管理好家人,加之日常工作繁忙、压力大,心理负担激增,于6月13日从天山区碱泉一街16号1503室跳楼自杀。
(四)亲属被收押(收教)学生假期不愿返回原籍,滞留我市给社会管理工作增加难度
走访了解,根据自治区教育厅安排,寒(暑)假期间,大中专院校学生必须离校,严禁在校内滞留。但一些南北疆籍的亲属被收押(收教)学生担心返回原籍后,因亲属被收押(收教)牵连到自己,寒(暑)假期间,多数学生不愿返回原籍,在乌市租房或居住于亲戚家中,给我们的日常管理工作增加难度。
(五)部分中专院校不愿招录亲属被收押(收教)及“标签”学生,这些学生过早流入社会,易造成隐患
了解掌握,以往高中毕业未考入高校和大专院校,又不愿复读的学生,可以自费前往技术类中专院校就读。但今年以来,一些中专院校在招录学生的同时,联系社区、警务站协助对招录学生进行背景审查,亲属被收押(收教)或有“标签”的学生,学校以各种理由拒绝招收,避免给学校带来麻烦,导致这些学生流入社会,通过零散务工维持生计,易成为极端分子拉拢的目标。
(六)地州公安机关收押(收教)我市大中专院校学生不通报、不反馈,导致后续工作跟进不及时
工作掌握,一些南北疆各地州公安机关因侦察工作需要,通过电话联系方式,将在校学生叫回原籍进行审查,或是学生假期返家期间,审查后直接采取收押、收教措施,属地分县局或校方与原籍联系相关情况,原籍公安机关不及时反馈,或是以侦察工作保密为由,不通报情况。导致我们不能准确掌握学生被收押(收教)情况,个别学生释放后返校上课,管控工作跟进不及时。
(七)毕业生、预科生的管控移交工作不规范
一是在我市大中专院校就读,即将毕业的亲属被收押(收教)及“标签”学生。二是考入内地大学,在我市大中专院校预科的亲属被收押(收教)及“标签”学生。这些学生毕业后以及预科结束前往内地大学就读,他们管控工作的移交缺乏必要的制度和机制保障,容易出现失管漏控的现象。
四、下一步工作措施及建议
一是依托驻大中专院校工作专班和联络员,密切掌握高校领域动态。部署便衣小分队,并调度秘密力量,依托驻大中专院校工作专班和联络员,密切关注在校教职员工和学生群体动态情况,及时发现思想波动异常,情绪反应异常,现实活动可疑等情况。
二是加强与区厅联系,协调各地州公安机关进一步规范在校学生收押(收教)工作。进一步加强与区厅的日常联络,规范各地州公安机关收押(收教)在校学生的协调、通报机制,确保实时掌握情况,及时跟进后续工作。
三是建议统一学生管控工作标准,减少不必要的工作负担。建议市委政法委协调督导组、社区、公安机关统一学生管控工作的标准,并按照自治区党委政法委相关精神,结合实际情况,切实减少日常管控工作需填写的表格数量,为教职员工减负,更好投入教学工作。
四是建议规范管控学生的移交工作。建议市委政法委协调上级单位及相关部门,规范管控学生毕业及预科结束后的移交工作,确保无缝衔接,严防出现失管漏控现象,造成稳定隐患。
2018年7月3日
报:陶红军局长、
卡德尔·买买提副局长、
举热提·伊不拉音副局长、一体化联合作战指挥中心。
编辑:胡常星 核搞:马文军 签发:王东升
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