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Recently, in accordance with the relevant stability-work arrangements from the City Party Committee, the City Public Security Bureau has, in order to gain a better understanding of developments in the higher-education sector, further strengthened its stability-maintenance task force for higher-education institutions, building on the intelligence and information work mechanisms for higher-education institutions that were established during earlier periods, to simultaneously coordinate covert operative support, closely monitor developments in the higher-education sector, and promptly obtain in-depth inside intelligence and information. Overall, since June 28, all higher and secondary specialized educational institutions have gradually begun their summer breaks. Teaching activities currently remain orderly and the ideological state of faculty and students is relatively stable, but certain risks and potential hazards remain. The details are as follows:

I. Overview of the higher and secondary specialized educational institutions in Urumqi

First, the city currently has 52 higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, with 76 campuses. These include 8 regular undergraduate institutions, 15 higher vocational institutions (3 under the Bingtuan), 27 secondary vocational institutions (16 under the region, 10 under the city, and 1 under the Bingtuan), and 2 religious institutions.

Second, there are 4 private colleges and 328 private non-degree training institutions (37 under the autonomous region, 291 under the city, and 7 ethnic-language institutions).

Third, the city's higher and secondary specialized educational institutions currently have a total of 211688 enrolled students and 21474 teaching and administrative staff.

Fourth, according to currently available information, across the city's higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, 488 enrolled students have been taken into custody (taken for education), 5573 students have relatives who have been taken into custody (taken for education), and 7044 students have a "tag".

II. All higher and secondary specialized educational institutions are able to focus on the overall goal and conscientiously implement the stability-maintenance measures of the Autonomous Region Party Committee

(i) On-campus security measures are fairly well implemented across the board

All educational institutions are able to strictly implement the system of leaders overseeing duty shifts, with reinforced shifts personally overseen by their principal leaders during critical and sensitive periods. They also actively strengthen coordination with the police stations at the higher-education institutions, the jurisdiction police stations, the nearby police service stations, and the specialized task forces stationed at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, establishing a coordinated stability-maintenance mechanism. They rigorously inspect vehicles and individuals entering campuses, conduct routine campus security patrols, increase visible police presence, and regularly conduct joint mobilization drills with police stations and police service stations to enhance their capacity to respond to emergencies and handle unexpected incidents.

(ii) Day-to-day student management is orderly, and control and supervision of focus students is well implemented

All educational institutions have widely implemented closed management, have strictly enforced the system for requesting and terminating leave, and have strictly prohibited enrolled students from renting housing or staying overnight off campus. At the same time, for students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education), they have established a system of "three-tier care and management" involving institution and department leaders, class heads, and student counselors, have created an individual file for each student, have designated personnel and responsibilities, have implemented "one-on-one" and "many-on-one" education-assistance measures, and have strictly carried out "daily meetings, weekly summaries, and monthly assessments", keeping a firm grasp on the actual activities and mental state of the focus students. In response to the lack of income and financial hardship faced by students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education), some educational institutions have provided a certain degree of financial assistance by disbursing student grants and establishing work-study positions.

(iii) Routine on-campus inspections are conducted, strictly preventing the proliferation of illegal religious activities

Higher and secondary specialized educational institutions throughout the city actively strengthen ties with public security organs and independently purchase the "Counter-Terrorist Sword" to regularly inspect the teaching and administrative staff's mobile phones, computers, and portable storage media. In conjunction with dormitory management, students’ electronic devices, personal belongings, and items stored in dormitories are inspected to promptly detect any instances of storing or viewing illegal religious and violent terrorist multimedia files, as well as any illegal religious activities conducted in the dormitories.

III. Risks and potential hazards at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, as well as problems in the implementation of stability-maintenance work

(i) Students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) and students with "tags" face difficulties in daily life and employment, which can easily push them into opposition

As learned through visits, with the neighborhood administrations and other grassroots stability-maintenance forces continuing to strengthen daily management and control-supervision work, some internship units and departments have cited various reasons to turn away interns and graduates whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or who have "tags", in order to avoid being affected themselves. Some units and departments have even extended this exclusion to ethnic minority students in general, treating them differently from Chinese-speaking students. This has left ethnic minority students, and the focus students in particular, facing difficulties finding employment, substantial obstacles in daily life, and heavy psychological burdens. In addition, some focus students worry that they will be taken into custody or taken for education if they return to their place of origin. These multiple forms of pressure can easily push these students into opposition, or even into participating in endangering-security violent terrorist activities.

For example: Principal Liu of the Xinjiang Supply and Marketing School reported that when students from the school who have a "tag" undertake internships or find employment, the neighborhood administration requires the person in charge of the employing unit to take the students with "tags" to report to the neighborhood administration every day, causing considerable disruption to the businesses’ daily operations and leading some businesses to stop recruiting students with "tags".

(ii) Standards for control and supervision work involving focus students are inconsistent, the work is highly challenging, and some teaching and administrative staff have been implicated as a result of the control and supervision work

First, as grasped following visits, when schools carry out day-to-day control and supervision work for students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) and students with "tags", inconsistent standards across public security organs, neighborhood administrations, and higher-level supervisory teams, along with the complexity of form types and documentation categories, have resulted in more than 30 types of forms needing to be completed as part of the control and supervision work for just 1 student.

Second, to implement the "daily meetings" system, prepare all required control and supervision materials, and avoid problems during supervisory inspections, some schools have adopted practices disconnected from actual needs, frequently holding talks with students under control and supervision and requiring them to affix their fingerprints. This has caused strong resentment among students, while leaving teachers with heavy workloads and considerable stress.

Third, some teaching and administrative staff have repeatedly been flagged to go to the neighborhood administration for verification because of being in phone contact with students under control and supervision. They have been required to report to the neighborhood administration daily and provide updates on their mental state, leaving some teaching and administrative staff unwilling to participate in the student control and supervision work, or even prompting them to resign outright, so as to avoid being implicated.

For example: Seven student counselors (5 Han, 1 Hui, and 1 Uyghur) at Xinjiang Normal University (Wenguang Campus on East Kashgar Road) resigned and left the university one after another because of, among other reasons, heavy workloads, intense pressure, prolonged periods of being unable to return home, and repeated checks by the neighborhood administration, prompted by their phone contact with students under control and supervision.

(iii) The continued, in-depth implementation of the "Study, Purge, Counter" campaign has yielded fairly good results, but a small minority of teaching and administrative staff are under considerable psychological pressure

In accordance with arrangements made by the Autonomous Region Department of Education, colleges and universities across our city have continued to carry out the "Study, Purge, Counter" special campaign in depth, requiring all teaching and administrative staff to repeatedly review their conduct, engage in self-analysis, look back on their participation in religious activities since entering the workforce, and critically examine their motives and purposes for participating. The majority of teaching and administrative staff who have participated in "nezir" and "circumcision" activities are unsure of whether they have violated any regulations. In addition, schools are reexamining the papers and books published by each teacher. Some teachers worry that content they have written or quoted from others in their articles may be problematic. They also fear that any relatives suspected of participating in endangering-security activities could adversely affect them, resulting in steadily mounting psychological pressure.

For example: At the Xinjiang Vocational and Technical College of Communications, a student counselor concealed the fact that her husband had been taken into custody and was dismissed after this was discovered by the school, while an externally hired teacher was reassigned from a teaching position because of low proficiency in the national language; Weli Tursun, director of the Xinjiang Light Industry Vocational and Technical College, repeatedly stated in public that he had failed to properly manage his family following his younger sister being taken into custody at her place of origin, which, combined with the heavy workload and intense pressure, caused his psychological burden to increase sharply, resulting in his death by suicide on June 13, jumping from Apartment 1503 at 16 No. 1 Jianquan Street in the Tianshan District.

(iv) Students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) are unwilling to return to their place of origin during school breaks, remaining in our city and making social management work more difficult

As learned through visits, students at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions must leave campus during winter (summer) vacations and are strictly prohibited from remaining on campus, in accordance with arrangements made by the Autonomous Region Department of Education. However, some students from northern and southern Xinjiang whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) worry that upon returning to their place of origin they will be implicated because their relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education). During winter (summer) vacations, most of these students are unwilling to return to their place of origin and instead rent accommodations or stay with relatives in Urumqi, making our day-to-day management work more difficult.

(v) Some secondary vocational schools are unwilling to admit students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or students with "tags"; these students enter society prematurely, which can easily give rise to potential risks

As has been learned, in the past when high school graduates were not admitted to universities or junior colleges and were unwilling to repeat their final year of high school, they could attend technical secondary schools at their own expense. Starting this year, however, some technical secondary schools have contacted neighborhood administrations and police service stations during admissions for help investigating the applicants’ backgrounds. Schools have used various pretexts to reject students whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or who have "tags", in order to avoid bringing trouble upon themselves. As a result, these students are left to fend for themselves in society, eking out a living through sporadic casual work and becoming easy targets for recruitment by extremists.

(vi) Prefectural public security organs fail to provide notification or feedback when taking into custody (taking for education) students from our city's higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, resulting in delays in subsequent follow-up work

It has been learned during work that some prefectural public security organs in northern and southern Xinjiang have, to meet investigative needs, contacted enrolled students by telephone and called them back to their place of origin to investigate them, or have investigated students while they were home on vacation and then applied the measures of taking them into custody or taking them for education immediately after. When the local public security sub- or county bureaus, or the school authorities, contact the students’ places of origin about these matters, the public security organs at the place of origin do not provide timely feedback, or withhold information on the grounds of investigative confidentiality. As a result, we cannot accurately ascertain which students have been taken into custody (taken for education). Some students have returned to school and resumed classes after being released, but the follow-up control and supervision work has not been timely.

(vii) The handover of control and supervision responsibilities for graduates and preparatory students is not standardized

First are students studying at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions in our city who are about to graduate and whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or who have "tags". Second are students admitted to universities in inner China who are taking preparatory courses at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions in our city and whose relatives have been taken into custody (taken for education) or who have "tags". The handover of control and supervision work, for when these students graduate or complete their preparatory courses and leave to attend universities in inner China, lacks the necessary institutional and procedural safeguards, making lapses and omissions in control and supervision likely.

IV. Next steps and recommendations

First, rely on the specialized task forces and liaison personnel stationed at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions to maintain a close grasp of the developments in higher education. Deploy plainclothes squads and mobilize covert operatives, relying on the specialized task forces and liaison personnel stationed at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions to closely monitor developments among teaching and administrative staff and students, promptly identifying any unusual shifts in thinking, abnormal emotional reactions, observed suspicious activities, and the like.

Second, strengthen contact with the regional department and coordinate with the various prefectural public security organs to further standardize the work of taking into custody (taking for education) students who are enrolled. Further strengthen routine liaison with the regional department and standardize coordination and notification mechanisms for the various prefectural public security organs taking into custody (taking for education) students who are enrolled, ensuring real-time awareness of the situation and timely follow-up work.

Third, it is recommended that standards for student control and supervision work be unified to reduce unnecessary workloads. It is recommended that the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the City Party Committee coordinate with the supervision and guidance group, neighborhood administrations, and public security organs to unify the standards for student control and supervision work. In accordance with the spirit of the relevant directives from the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Autonomous Region Party Committee and in light of actual circumstances, concrete steps should then be taken to reduce the number of forms required for routine control and supervision work, easing the burden on teaching and administrative staff so they can better focus on teaching.

Fourth, it is recommended that the handover of students under control and supervision be standardized. It is recommended that the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the City Party Committee coordinate with higher authorities and relevant departments to standardize the handover of students under control and supervision after graduation or completion of preparatory programs, ensure a seamless transition, and strictly prevent any lapses in control and supervision that could pose risks to stability.

July 3, 2018

To: Bureau Director Tao Hongjun, Deputy Bureau Director Qadir Memet, Deputy Bureau Director Juret Ibrahim, Integrated Joint Operations Command Center.

Edited by: Hu Changxing Reviewed by: Ma Wenjun Issued by: Wang Dongsheng